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Abstract. 
Our study analyzes a large sample of transactions carried out by corporate insiders 
reported to the German regulatory authority BaFin in the period July 1, 2002 to April 
30, 2005 employing event study methodology. In particular, we focus on the question 
whether corporate insiders exploit inside information while trading in their company’s 
stock. Therefore we use a distinct property of German law, i.e. company’s obligation to 
reveal inside information through ad-hoc news disclosures, to link trading of insiders to 
their foreknowledge of important corporate news. We find strong evidence that insiders 
exploit inside information as they earn above average profits by front-running on 
subsequent news disclosures. Furthermore, looking at the type of insider, we find that 
members of the supervisory board (directors) and the group of other insiders (basically 
family members of senior managers and directors) profit substantially from exploiting 
inside information. In contrast, members of the executive board (senior managers) can 
be largely exculpated from exploiting inside information as they realize below average 
returns with their rare front-running transactions. 
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1. Introduction 
The question whether corporate insiders exploit inside information while trading in their 
company’s stock attracts the attention of academia and the public alike.1 Moreover, the 
answer to this question is also crucial for regulatory authorities, since on a capital 
market there is a loser for each winner. In particular, if corporate insiders exploit inside 
information, high profits received by corporate insiders reduce the returns of all other 
uniformed traders (including the market maker). Thus, a well developed capital market 
requires an effective insider regulation to protect uninformed investors. Our study 
basically addresses three questions. First, we analyze whether corporate insiders earn 
abnormal profits while trading in their company’s stock. Second, we use a distinct 
property of German law, i.e. the companies’ obligation of companies to reveal inside 
information through ad-hoc news disclosures, to examine whether profits realized by 
corporate insiders seem to be due to the exploitation of inside information or not. 
Finally, we explore which group of insiders is most active in exploiting inside 
information: the one which is best informed about a company’s prospects (i.e., senior 
managers) or the one which is probably least closely watched by the regulator (i.e., 
family members of senior managers and directors). 
Today, insider regulations prohibit the exploitation of inside information on capital 
markets in nearly all developed countries. In Germany, §14 WpHG (Security Trading 
Act) prohibits the exploitation and transmission of inside information. According to 
German law, inside information can be described as any specific information which is 
not subject to public knowledge and which, if it became publicly known, would likely 
have a significant effect on the stock price of the respective company (§13 WpHG). 
Moreover, §15 WpHG requires an immediate public disclosure (ad-hoc announcement) 
of any inside information (as defined in §13 WpHG) by the respective company. As 
corporate insiders (i.e., senior managers, directors and their family members) are 
                                                 
1 In 2005, according to its annual report, the German regulatory authority Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) investigated 54 cases related to suspected insider trading. E.g., 
several managers at DaimlerChrysler were suspected to exploit inside information prior to the resignation 
of the former CEO Jürgen Schrempp (Handelsblatt, August 29, 2005). However, the probably most 
prominent suspicion was about the former Co-CEO of the European Aeronautic Defence and Space 
Company (EADS), Noël Forgeard, who sold together with his children stocks and stock options for a 
seven digit profit just a few weeks before EADS disclosed severe difficulties in the production of the 
airplane A380 (Handelsblatt, June 21, 2006). 
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particularly suspected to possess and exploit inside information, due to their superior 
knowledge about company’s prospects, §15a WpHG additionally requires companies to 
report and publish corporate insiders’ transactions in their company’s stock. 
Particularly, since July 1, 2002, corporate insider transactions have to be reported to the 
regulatory authority, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin)2, 
which monitors whether transactions were based on the exploitation of inside 
information. 
Trading activities of corporate insiders have been subject to a large number of studies. 
One strand of literature focuses on the announcement day of insider transactions and 
explores if uninformed outsiders can benefit by mimicking insider transactions (e.g., 
Jaffe (1974); Seyhun (1986); Rozeff and Zaman (1988); Bettis et al. (1997); and 
Fidrmuc et al. (2006)). Remarkably, the literature finds that even uninformed outsiders 
can earn abnormal profits using publicly available information, at least when transaction 
costs are ignored. This indicates that outsiders can earn significant abnormal profits by 
mimicking insider transactions. Betzer and Theissen (2005), Klinge et al. (2005) and 
Stotz (2006) confirm these results for the German market. 
Another strand of literature, however, is motivated by the question whether corporate 
insiders exploit inside information obtaining abnormal profits by trading in company’s 
stock (e.g., Lorie and Niederhoffer (1968); Jaffe (1974); Finnerty (1976); Seyhun 
(1986); Eckbo and Smith (1998); Jeng et al. (1999); and Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). 
The literature documents that insiders earn high abnormal profits while trading in 
company’s stocks.3 Although most of the early work routinely attributed abnormal 
profits to the exploitation of private and therefore inside information, a final assessment 
is anything but trivial. On the one hand, profits of insiders could indeed originate in the 
exploitation of inside information. On the other hand, profits documented for corporate 
insiders could be caused solely by outsiders who blindly mimic the trades of insiders in 
a herd-like manner, even though the insiders traded on publicly available information. 
Therefore, more recent studies have tried to link trading of insiders to their 
foreknowledge of important corporate events, including bankruptcy (Seyhun and 
                                                 
2 Section 2 of this paper discusses the definition of corporate insiders as well as the regulation and 
reporting requirements for insider trades more in detail. 
3 A differing result is reported by Eckbo and Smith (1998). 
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Bradley (1997)), dividend initiations (John and Lang (1991)), seasoned equity offerings 
(Karpoff and Lee (1991)), stock repurchases (Lee et al. (1992)), takeover bids (Seyhun 
(1990)) and earnings announcements (Elliott et al. (1984); Noe (1999); and Ke et al. 
(2003)). These studies basically find that insiders trade upon forthcoming corporate 
news. Thus, the evidence suggests that insiders exploit inside information. Unlike the 
cited studies which focus on a particular type of corporate news disclosure exclusively, 
Givoly and Palmon (1985) analyze the connection between insider trading and a large 
variety of news reports published in the Wall Street Journal subsequent to the insider 
trading day. They conclude that insiders do not seem to exploit inside information as 
their profits are not associated with the disclosure of specific news. Although the cited 
studies investigate the connection between insider trading and important corporate 
events, they have a decisive shortcoming. They are not able to link insider trading to a 
formal definition of inside information. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, distinct from most studies 
on insider trading which focus on capital markets with a long history of insider 
regulation like Anglo-Saxon markets, we analyze the German market and thus provide 
evidence for a market with a relatively new legislation.4 Second, unlike prior studies 
which were unable to link insider trading to a formal definition of inside information, 
the fact that in Germany any inside information has to be disclosed via an ad-hoc news 
announcement offers a unique opportunity to evaluate whether corporate insiders 
exploit inside information. Third, the attitude to exploit inside information may differ 
between different types of insiders. In Germany, three different groups of insiders have 
to report their trading records to the BaFin. Members of the executive board (senior 
managers), which are involved in day-to-day business operations, are obliged to report 
their transactions to the BaFin. In addition, trading of members of the supervisory board 
(directors), which are usually not involved in day-to-day business operations, is also 
supervised by the BaFin. Last, the group of other insiders, which mainly consists of 
family members of senior managers and directors, have to reveal their trading in 
company’s stock. To the best of our knowledge, the question whether the group of 
insiders which is best informed about company’s prospects (i.e., senior managers) or the 
                                                 
4 Please note that until July 1, 2002 corporate insiders in Germany did not have to reveal trades in 
company’s stock. 
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group which is probably least closely watched by the regulator (i.e., other insiders) is 
most active in exploiting inside information, is basically unexplored. Finally, our results 
yield important implications for an improved supervision and enforcement of German 
insider law.  
With respect to our first research question which deals with the profitability of insider 
transactions, our results indicate that corporate insiders in Germany are able to identify 
profitable and unprofitable investment situations and thus realize substantial profits by 
trading in company’s stock. Considering a 20-day period subsequent to the trading day, 
stocks traded by insiders are associated with significant cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs): 3.76% for purchases and –1.37% for sales. Concerning our second research 
question, we find that insiders as a group are engaged in the exploitation of inside 
information on the buy side as they earn exceptionally high profits with those 
transactions which are shortly succeeded by an ad-hoc news disclosure of the respective 
company. With respect to our third research question, we document directors to be most 
active in purchasing prior to ad-hoc news disclosures. In contrast, senior managers are 
less active in front-running on corporate news as they rarely purchase company’s stock 
prior to an ad-hoc news disclosure. Finally and most importantly, we show that directors 
and the group of other insiders earn exceptionally high profits with their purchases 
which front-run on corporate news disclosures and thus seem to exploit inside 
information extensively. In contrast, senior managers can be largely exculpated from 
exploiting inside information, since they realize below average profits with transactions 
succeeded by a corporate news disclosure.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the legal 
background of insider trading in Germany whereas section 3 addresses the database, 
provides some descriptive statistics and discusses the methodology. Section 4 presents 
the results concerning our three research questions. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Legal Background 
Since 1934, rule 10b-5 of the Security Exchange Act prohibits the exploitation of inside 
information by corporate insiders in the US. A corresponding framework for the 
German capital market was passed as late as in 1994. Since then, §14 WpHG (Security 
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Trading Act) prohibits the exploitation of inside information as well as its transmission 
to a third party. Moreover, §15 WpHG requires exchange traded firms to disclose any 
inside information immediately to the public (ad-hoc announcement). Before disclosing 
the information, the firm has to notify the management of the stock exchanges as well 
as the supervisory authority BaFin. Firms usually use special service providers which 
transmit the information to the market to fulfill these obligations.  
Since July 1, 2002, it is not only prohibited to corporate insiders to trade on inside 
information, but they also have to publish and report trades in securities of their 
company. According to §15a WpHG, members of the executive board, members of the 
supervisory board of exchange listed companies as well as their family members are 
obliged to report transactions in companies’ securities to their company and to the 
German financial supervisory authority BaFin, which monitors whether the transaction 
was based on the exploitation of inside information. Trading activities have to be 
reported without delay. Additionally, the firm has to publish the report on its web site or 
in a financial newspaper. Unlike in the US or UK, transactions carried out by former 
board members and large shareholders are not covered by the German insider law and 
therefore do not have to be reported. Furthermore, no report is required if the total 
amount of all transactions in a 30-day period does not exceed 25,000 €. In 2004, §15a 
was amended. Since October 30, 2004, persons discharging managerial responsibilities 
are also obliged to report their transactions. The reporting period for trading activities 
was specified to occur within five business days. The lower limit, which does not 
require a disclosure, was also reduced to 5,000 € per person in a calendar year. 
Furthermore, companies are now required to maintain lists of persons which have 
access to inside information (§15b WpHG). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Our empirical analysis covers insider transactions in German stocks between July 1, 
2002 and April 30, 2005, which were reported to the BaFin. For each observation the 
respective database provided by the BaFin contains the company’s name, the 
International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) of the reporting company, the 
name and type of the reporting insider (e.g., a member of the executive board), the 
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trading and announcement day, the kind of transaction (e.g., a purchase of a stock), the 
number of securities traded, the stock price at which the transaction was executed, and 
the publishing media.  
To check and complement the database we match the information contained in the 
original database with statements from the company’s annual reports and information 
published on the company’s web site and other financial web sites.5 The Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc Publizität (DGAP) and euro-adhoc are the main providers 
which transmit ad-hoc news to the market. We use their databases to identify ad-hoc 
news releases subsequent to the trading day. Data on stock returns we extract from 
Datastream.  
As our study focuses on the German legislation and the German market we only cover 
trades in stocks with a German ISIN (DE-ISIN). The original database contains 6,328 
transactions carried out by insiders in 416 different firms. In a first step, we exclude 
duplicate and incomplete entries as well as transactions connected with derivates, stock 
options, security lending, changes in the capital structure, and take-over bids. In 
addition, transactions among insiders, which are rather driven by strategic, liquidity or 
tax reasons, are also excluded. In 1,577 cases the database includes two or more 
transactions of the same insider in the same stock on a given day. This is the case if an 
insider trades more than once on the same day or if the broker executes the order in two 
or more pieces. We aggregate these partial executions and multiple trades of the same 
individual in the same security on a given day. Furthermore, we exclude 136 
observations due to incomplete return data. Finally, in 125 cases firms disclose ad-hoc 
news on the transaction day itself. As mentioned before, we use ad-hoc news 
disclosures to link insider trading to a potential exploitation of inside information. As 
we do not have information about the exact trading time, we could not determine 
whether the corporate insider traded prior to the respective ad-hoc news disclosure. 
Thus, these transactions were excluded from the sample. Table I shows the generation 
of our final sample which consists of 3,079 insider transactions in 351 different firms. 
Thereof, 767 transactions in the final sample are succeeded by a subsequent ad-hoc 
news disclosure in the following 20 trading days. 
                                                 
5 E.g., www.finanzen.net, www.insiderdaten.de. 
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Table I: Description of sample 
 
This table displays the number of transactions reported to the BaFin as well as the necessary corrections 
to obtain the final sample. 
 
Type of Transaction Number of Transactions
Insider Transactions reported to the BaFin 7,543
Transactions in Foreign Corporations Dual Listed in Germany -1,215
Insider Transactions in German Corporations 6,328
Duplicate and Incomplete Entries -104
Transactions concerning
Stock Options and Derivatives -633
Security Lending and Donation -115
Capital Structure -246
Take-Over-Bids (acc. WpÜG) -145
Others -34
Transactions among Insiders -134
Partial Execution and Multiple Transactions on a Given Day -1,577
Incomplete or No Return Data -136
News Disclosure at Transaction Day -125
Insider Transactions in the Final Sample 3,079
Insider Transactions in the Final Sample with News Disclosure 767
Insider Transactions in the Final Sample without News Disclosure 2,312
 
 
Table II shows that the number of transactions on the buy and sell side is rather 
balanced. In particular, purchases account for about 54% of all insider trades (1,643 out 
of 3,079). With respect to the insider’s position, we find members of the executive 
board and members of the supervisory board to trade most frequently. Members of the 
executive board (members of the supervisory board) account for 831 (579) purchases 
and 535 (569) sales transactions. They correspond to about 44% (37%) of all 
transactions. Consequently, the group of other insiders trades least frequently. Besides, 
the group of other insiders is the only group where the number of sales (332) exceeds 
the number of purchases (233).  
In total, insiders traded stocks for more than 1.86 € billion. Interestingly, although they 
trade least frequently, the group of other insiders trade the highest volumes accounting 
for almost 40% of the total trading volume. In particular, their median (mean) 
transaction volume of 61,619 € (1,306,823 €) is above the average. Senior managers and 
directors trade smaller volumes. The median (mean) transaction volume for senior 
managers accounts for 27,935 € (401,423 €) whereas the respective number for directors 
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is 22,500 € (501,975 €). We also find that transaction volumes for purchases are on 
average smaller than for sales. The median (mean) transaction volume for sales of 
57,484 € (957,600 €) is more than three times larger than the volume for purchases 
18,071 € (296,927 €). Consequently, although the number of sales is lower than the 
number of purchases, sales account for 74% of the total trading volume. Moreover, all 
groups of insiders are net sellers.  
 
Table II: Descriptive statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics. In particular, information about the number of transactions, the 
mean (median) value of transactions and the mean (median) market capitalization of traded firms are 
displayed for the entire sample (all transactions) as well as for purchases and sales separately. 
 
Purchases Sales All Transactions
Number of Traded Firms 241 250 351
Number of Transactions
Total 1,643 1,436 3,079
Members of Executive Board 831 535 1,366
Members of Supervisory Board 579 569 1,148
Other Insiders 233 332 565
Mean Value of Transactions (in €thousand)
Total 296,927 957,600 605,055
Members of Executive Board 95,737 876,235 401,423
Members of Supervisory Board 406,822 598,801 501,975
Other Insiders 741,392 1,703,647 1,306,823
Median Value of Transactions (in €thousand)
Total 18,071 57,484 29,513
Members of Executive Board 17,171 72,000 27,935
Members of Supervisory Board 12,000 39,082 22,500
Other Insiders 48,504 77,206 61,619
Mean Market Capitalization (in €million)
Total 2,319 1,351 1,868
Members of Executive Board 2,507 413 1,687
Members of Supervisory Board 1,198 1,341 1,269
Other Insiders 4,436 2,880 3,522
Median Market Capitalization (in €million)
Total 43 53 4
Members of Executive Board 35 55 43
Members of Supervisory Board 43 38 43
Other Insiders 202 171 172
4
 
 
As in most empirical studies the distribution of firm size is skewed. The mean market 
capitalization of a traded firm is 1,868 € million and thereby highly exceeds the median 
market capitalization which equals 44 € million. Moreover, the group of other insiders 
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does not only trade higher volumes. They also trade in bigger companies. In particular, 
the median (mean) market capitalization in which the group of other insiders trades 
equals 172 € million (3,522 € million). 
 
3.2. METHODOLOGY  
The purpose of our study is to measure the short-term profits of insiders which trade in 
their company’s stock. In accordance with most studies on insider trading, we measure 
these profits in an event study framework. Concretely, we measure abnormal returns, 
i.e., returns that deviate from the normal return, subsequent to the insider trading day by 
applying standard event-study methodology outlined by MacKinlay (1997). For each 
transaction, calendar time is converted to event time by defining the day on which the 
insider executed the transaction as event day [0]. The estimation period encompasses 
the period from [-199] to [-21], whereas the period from [-20] to [+20] is defined as the 
event period. 
Abnormal returns for any given point in time and stock are defined as the difference 
between realized6 and normal returns. In order to estimate these expected normal 
returns, we choose the market model as surveyed by Brown and Warner (1985). First, 
for raw returns of each traded stock, we estimate OLS parameters in the estimation 
period while using the value-weighted CDAX as the independent variable. This index 
consists of the entire universe of stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Within 
the context of the market model, the normal return on each day in the event period is 
defined as the return of the CDAX, adjusted by the estimated OLS parameters. To 
calculate the market reaction for more than one day we cumulate abnormal returns for 
the respective period. 
In order to test for statistical significance of abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) we apply the traditional t-test based on Brown and 
Warner (1985). Since this method has shown to be sensitive to asymmetrically 
distributed returns and event-induced increases in variance (e.g., Brown and Warner 
(1985); and Boehmer et al. (1991)), we also employ the nonparametric rank test based 
                                                 
6 To calculate realized returns, we download the data type RI from Datastream which includes 
adjustments for dividends and stock splits.  
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on Corrado (1989) to test for robustness. This type of test is correctly specified 
independently from the skewness of cross-sectional distribution of abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, it is less affected by event-induced increases in variance compared to 
parametric tests. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. INSIDER PROFITS 
First, we address the question whether corporate insiders do earn abnormal returns by 
trading in their company’s stock. Table III displays cumulative abnormal returns for 
distinct periods prior and subsequent to the insider trading day for purchases and sales 
separately. It shows that corporate insiders actually do earn abnormal returns with their 
transactions. 
 
Table III: Cumulative abnormal returns for purchases and sales 
 
This table reports mean cumulative abnormal returns for distinct periods prior and subsequent to the day 
of insider trading [0]. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level (two-tailed 
test) according to the parametric t-test based on Brown and Warner (1985). +++, ++, + indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level according to the nonparametric rank test based on Corrado 
(1989). 
 
Mean SD Mean SD
CAR[-20;-1] -1.10% *** +++ 16.65 8.91% *** +++ 29.08
CAR[0;1] 0.25% ** 6.00 0.57% *** + 8.43
CAR[0;5] 1.36% *** +++ 10.53 0.32% 13.28
CAR[0;10] 2.19% *** +++ 14.47 -0.69% * ++ 16.17
CAR[0;20] 3.76% *** +++ 18.64 -1.37% ** +++ 23.85
Purchases (N  = 1643) Sales (N  = 1436)
 
 
Looking at the immediate stock price reaction associated with purchases, we find a 
moderate but positive CAR[0;+1] of 0.25%, a return which is statistically significant 
according to the parametric t-test. However, this immediate price reaction does not offer 
economically significant profits to insiders. Nevertheless, cumulative abnormal returns 
for longer periods are both statistically (according to the parametric t-test and the 
nonparametric rank test by Corrado) as well as economically significant. E.g., the 
cumulative abnormal return for the 20-day period following the trading day CAR[0;20] 
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offers a decent 3.76% profit for the average insider transaction on the buy side. 
Interestingly, from the perspective of the efficient market hypothesis, the price reaction 
is strikingly slow. In particular, after a period of five trading days subsequent to the 
insider transaction, only about 36% of the total increase within the 20-day event 
window is incorporated in stock prices (1.36% compared to 3.76%). The respective 
fraction for the ten-day period is about 58% (CAR[0;+10] equals 2.19%), an almost 
linear adjustment to the cumulative abnormal return at the end of the event window. The 
rather slow adjustment in stock prices might be explained by legal aspects. As discussed 
before, corporate insiders have to announce their trading records to the regulatory 
authority BaFin shortly after they have executed their order. Our data reveals that the 
median (mean) time period between the trading and the announcement day is three (ten) 
trading days for purchases. Thus, since insider transactions are closely followed by 
many investors, it may trigger a wave of transactions in the same direction by outsiders, 
thereby generating abnormal returns subsequent to the trading day. In addition, news 
releases by the company or reports issued by financial analysts, for instance, might 
impact stock prices subsequent to the insider’s trading day as well.7
With respect to sale transactions, a different picture emerges. The immediate price 
reaction CAR[0;+1] shows to be positive with 0.57%. Thus, stock prices do not reflect 
the negative information immediately. However, if one looks at the 20 trading days after 
the transaction, stocks sold by insiders drop by -1.37%. Although this moderate decline 
in stock prices does not necessarily yield economically significant profits for insiders 
when direct and indirect transactions costs are taken into account (see, e.g., Keim and 
Madhavan (1998); Berkowitz and Logue (2001)), for the different components of 
transaction cost), the cumulative abnormal return is statistically significant according to 
the parametric t-test as well as the non-parametric rank test by Corrado (1989).  
The finding that insiders realize greater profits with their purchases than with their sales 
is also documented in the literature.8 Unlike purchases, which are primarily motivated 
by the desire to realize profits, sales might be triggered by other considerations. First, 
                                                 
7 Please note that the finding of a slow price adjustment is documented in several other studies. See, (e.g., 
Givoly and Palmon (1985), Seyhun (1986), Bettis et al. (1997), Jeng et al. (2003) for the US; Friederich et 
al. (2002) for the UK; and Klinge et al. (2005) and Stotz (2006) for Germany). 
8 See, (e.g., Bettis et al. (1997); Lakonishok and Lee (2001); and Jeng et al. (2003) for the US; Friederich 
et al. (2002) for the UK; and Betzer and Theissen (2005) for Germany. Differing results are found by, 
e.g., Seyhun (1986), Givoly and Palmon (1985), Klinge et al. (2005), and Stotz (2006)). 
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basically only sales are motivated by diversification objectives and therefore might be 
non information-driven. For instance, many senior managers are strongly invested with 
their human capital in their firm and often have large holdings of company’s stock. In 
addition, senior managers are increasingly compensated by stock option programs 
which allocate a substantial part of their personal wealth to their firm. As a 
consequence, the decision to sell a stock might be triggered by the desire to adjust 
portfolio weights to the optimal, or at least to a more balanced level. This rationale can 
be supported by our data. Insiders sell stocks after substantial price increases. In 
particular, insiders sell stocks which yield a highly significant positive CAR[-20;-1] of 
8.91% in the 20 trading days prior to the insider trading day. As a substantially 
increased stock price of the firm, ceteris paribus, increases the respective portfolio 
weight in the insider’s portfolio considerably, selling company’s stock might help to 
readjust the respective risk exposure to the prior level. Second, another non 
information-driven reason which is more prevalent for sales than for purchases is 
liquidity. If a corporate insider wants to buy a new mansion or Learjet, she might prefer 
to sell some corporate stocks, especially if they recently went up in prices. Moreover, 
sales may be motivated by tax considerations. 
Interestingly, although this issue is somewhat beyond the scope of our paper, insiders 
are amazingly good at identifying turning points as they buy (sell) at the end of 
downward (upward) movements and at the beginning of upward (downward) 
movements of company’s stock price. In particular, we find corporate insiders to follow 
contrarian strategies. Table III displays a negative abnormal return CAR[-20;-1] of 
highly significant -1.10% in the 20 trading days prior to the purchase. For sales, the 
tendency to act as a contrarian investor is even more pronounced. As mentioned before, 
we find that the average stock sold by an insider yields a highly significant positive 
CAR[-20;-1] with 8.91%. The finding that corporate insiders act as contrarian investors 
is well documented in the literature (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee (2001); Friederich et 
al.°(2002); and Stotz°(2006)). 
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4.2. DO INSIDERS EXPLOIT INSIDE INFORMATION? 
A decisive prerequisite to answer the question whether corporate insiders exploit inside 
information is the identification of those transactions which may exploit inside 
information. In an ideal world one could directly observe the information set of an 
insider at the transaction day. Unfortunately, in reality this information is basically 
unobservable. Thus, one has to find an observable proxy for inside information. 
Probably the best way to identify trades which are likely to be based on inside 
information formally, is to link corporate insider trading to ad-hoc news disclosures 
subsequent to the insider trading day. As mentioned before, German firms are required 
to disclose any inside information to the public via an ad-hoc announcement. Those ad-
hoc announcements deal with corporate events which are likely to have a significant 
effect on the stock price like, e.g., changes in the executive board structure, earnings 
announcements, and merger activities. Thus, insider trading prior to ad-hoc news 
disclosures is a first indication for the exploitation of inside information, since corporate 
insiders are likely to know at least the tendency of the ad-hoc news prior to their 
disclosure. For instance, it is hard to believe that a senior manager is not continuously 
informed about the performance of her firm or is not involved in and informed about 
takeover proceedings.  
However, companies disclose specific ad-hoc news like quarterly earnings on a rather 
regular basis. Thus, some ad-hoc announcements might not contain unexpected news. 
Consequently, not every transaction prior to an ad-hoc news disclosure necessarily 
exploits inside information. Two scenarios have to be distinguished in order to detect 
the exploitation of inside information. On the one hand, if insiders exploit inside 
information by front-running on ad-hoc news disclosures, they should, ceteris paribus, 
earn higher profits with those transactions compared to the remaining transactions 
without a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure. On the other hand, if insiders do not 
exploit inside information while trading prior to news disclosures, the profits of 
transactions with subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure should be similar to profits of 
transactions without subsequent news disclosure. As a consequence, we feel confident 
to accuse insiders of exploitation of inside information if transactions of insiders, which 
are succeeded by an ad-hoc news disclosure of the respective company in the 
subsequent 20 trading days, are associated with higher profits compared to the 
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remaining transactions without an ad-hoc news disclosure. In the following, we will 
refer to those transactions as unethical or illegal. 
Table IV displays cumulative abnormal returns for several periods subsequent to the 
insider trading day for purchases and sales separately. The first vertical panel addresses 
transactions with a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure in the mentioned period. The 
second panel addresses transactions without a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure and 
the third vertical panel displays the difference in means between the first two panels. 
 
Table IV. Cumulative abnormal returns, by ad-hoc news disclosure after transaction 
 
This table displays mean cumulative abnormal returns for distinct periods subsequent to the day of insider 
trading [0] separated by whether ad-hoc news were disclosed during the 20 trading days subsequent to the 
transaction. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level (two-tailed test) 
according to the parametric t-test based on Brown and Warner (1985). +++, ++, + indicate whether the mean 
cumulative abnormal returns of the subgroups are statistically different at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level 
according to the two-sample t-test. 
 
CAR[0;1] 0.16% 0.28% ** -0.12%
CAR[0;5] 2.19% *** 1.10% *** 1.09% +
CAR[0;10] 3.33% *** 1.81% *** 1.52% +
CAR[0;20] 5.05% *** 3.34% *** 1.71% +
CAR[0;1] 0.27% 0.68% *** -0.41%
CAR[0;5] -0.27% 0.52% -0.79%
CAR[0;10] -1.35% * -0.47% -0.88%
CAR[0;20] -2.05% ** -1.14% * -0.91%
Transactions with Transactions without Differences in
Panel B. Sales (N  = 1436)
N  = 364 N  = 1072
Transactions without
N  = 1240
Transactions with 
N  = 403
Differences in
Panel A. Purchases (N  = 1643)
News Disclosure News Disclosure Means
News Disclosure News Disclosure Means
 
 
With respect to purchases, we find that 403 of the total 1,643 purchases are succeeded 
by an ad-hoc news disclosure, representing a fraction of almost 25%. Remarkably, those 
403 transactions yield substantially higher profits for insiders compared to the 
remaining transactions. In particular, corporate insiders earn an abnormal profit of 
5.05% within the 20 trading days after they front-run on ad-hoc news disclosures. For 
transactions without a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure, we document a respective 
value of mere 3.34%. Moreover, the difference in mean profits between trades which 
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front-run on corporate news disclosure and the remaining transactions without a 
subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure is statistically significant on the 10%-level starting 
with CAR[0;+5] onward. Thus, we find strong evidence for the exploitation of inside 
information according to our definition. Corporate insiders as a group purchase 
companies’ stocks in an unethical way. 
Concerning sales, results are quite similar. The fraction of sales which is succeeded by 
an ad-hoc news disclosure is about 25%. Again, the profits associated with those 
transactions are considerably higher for all analyzed periods. However, the differences 
in means between transactions with and without subsequent news disclosure are 
statistically insignificant. In consequence, the evidence that corporate insiders exploit 
inside information while selling company’s stock is less solid than for purchases. 
Despite the lack of statistical significance, e.g., the CAR[0;+20] is almost double the 
magnitude for sales which front-run on subsequent news releases compared to the 
remaining transactions.  
 
4.3. WHICH TYPE OF INSIDER EXPLOITS INSIDE INFORMATION? 
In this section we want to investigate which type of corporate insider is particularly 
engaged in exploiting inside information. To put things differently, we want to figure 
out if it is primarily the group of members of the executive board, the group of members 
of the supervisory board or the group of other corporate insiders which tend to trade in 
an unethical manner. Table V displays for each group of insiders the group-specific 
fraction of trades with a subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure separately. In addition, the 
respective fraction for the total sample as well as the difference between the fractions 
for the group and for the total sample are displayed in the table. Panel A shows the 
respective statistics for purchases, whereas Panel B refers to sales.  
As far as purchases are concerned, senior managers are less often engaged in 
transactions which are succeeded by corporate news. The fraction of purchases with a 
subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure is only 19.86% compared to the average of the total 
sample which shows to be 24.56%. In addition, the binomial test indicates on a 
statistically significant level that senior managers find themselves more frequently in 
the group of transactions without ad-hoc news disclosures. A different picture emerges 
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for directors. With respect to trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosures, 32.12% of the 
purchases carried out by directors front-run on corporate news. Moreover, the binomial 
test strongly suggests that directors trade more frequently prior to ad-hoc news 
disclosures. Finally, the group of other insiders is not predominantly engaged in trading 
prior to ad-hoc news. In contrast to the findings for purchases, we do not find any group 
of insiders to be particularly engaged in trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosure on the 
sell side.  
 
Table V. Distribution of transactions with subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure, by type 
of insider 
 
This table reports the distribution of purchases and sales for the total sample and for different types of 
insider separately. (1) displays for the respective group of insiders the fraction of the number of purchases 
with a subsequent news disclosure to the total number of purchases by the respective group. Accordingly, 
(2) gives the respective numbers for the total sample. E.g. the fraction of 24.56% for purchases is 
calculated as the number of purchases with a subsequent news disclosure (403) divided by the total 
number of purchases (1643). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level 
according to the binomial test. 
 
Percentage of Purchases with News in Group (1) 19.86% 32.12% 22.32%
Percentage of Purchases with News in Total Sample (2) 24.56% 24.56% 24.56%
(1) - (2) -4.70% *** 7.56% *** -2.24%
Percentage of Sales with News in Group (1) 24.11% 25.13% 27.71%
Percentage of Sales with News in Total Sample (2) 25.35% 25.35% 25.35%
(1) - (2) -1.24% -0.22% 2.36%
Other InsidersExecutive Board Supervisory Board
Members of Members of
Executive Board Supervisory Board
Panel B. Sales (N  = 1436)
Other Insiders
Panel A. Purchases (N  = 1643)
Members of Members of
 
 
As mentioned before, insider trading prior to ad-hoc news disclosures becomes 
ultimately a problem for the regulator and the functionality of the market when insiders 
realize superior profits with those transactions. Thus, Table VI shows cumulative 
abnormal returns for transactions with and transactions without subsequent ad-hoc news 
disclosures for each group of insiders separately. Thereby, Panel A shows the respective 
statistics for purchases, whereas Panel B refers to sales. 
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Table VI. Cumulative abnormal returns, by type of insider and subsequent ad-hoc news disclosure 
 
This table displays mean cumulative abnormal returns for distinct periods subsequent to the day of insider trading [0] separated by whether ad-hoc news were disclosed 
during the 20 trading days subsequent to the transaction and by type of insider. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level (two-tailed test) 
according to the parametric t-test based on Brown and Warner (1985). +++, ++, + indicate whether the mean cumulative abnormal returns of the subgroups are statistically 
different at the 1%-, 5%-, 10%-level according to the two-sample t-test. 
 
CAR[0;1] -0.36% 0.42% ** -0.78% 0.48% -0.01% 0.49% 0.67% 0.41% 0.26%
CAR[0;5] 0.75% 1.52% *** -0.77% 3.17% *** 0.51% 2.66% ++ 3.23% *** 0.79% * 2.44% +
CAR[0;10] 1.35% 2.52% *** -1.17% 4.76% *** 0.87% 3.89% +++ 4.49% *** 1.25% ** 3.24%
CAR[0;20] 2.39% 4.45% *** -2.06% 6.57% *** 1.89% ** 4.68% ++ 8.05% *** 2.36% *** 5.69% +++
CAR[0;1] 0.65% 0.89% *** -0.24% -0.19% 0.53% -0.72% 0.44% 0.59% -0.15%
CAR[0;5] -0.64% 0.62% -1.26% 0.64% 0.98% -0.34% -1.15% -0.48% -0.67%
CAR[0;10] -1.13% -0.16% -0.97% -0.51% -0.14% -0.37% -2.97% *** -1.58% ** -1.39%
CAR[0;20] -2.74% * -1.22% -1.52% -1.79% -0.15% -1.64% -1.49% -2.76% *** 1.27%
N  = 240  in meansN  = 143 N  = 426  in means N  = 92
News No News Difference
Other Insiders
N  = 52 N  = 181  in means
Other Insiders
News No News Difference
No News Difference
N  = 129 N  = 406  in means
News No News Difference News
Members of Executive Board Members of Supervisory Board
N  = 165 N  = 666  in means
Panel B. Sales
N  = 186 N  = 393  in means
Panel A. Purchases
News No News Difference
Members of Executive Board Members of Supervisory Board
News No News Difference
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For purchases, we find that senior managers do not seem to be engaged in unethical 
insider trading. Not only do they trade less frequently prior to ad-hoc news releases; 
senior managers also realize profits below average. Particularly, the CAR[0;+20] equals 
2.39% for purchases with subsequent news disclosures in the 20 trading days after the 
trading day, whereas senior managers obtain 4.45% with transactions which were not 
succeeded by ad-hoc news disclosures. However, from a statistical point of view, the 
difference in means of -2.06% is not statistically different from zero. A very different 
picture emerges when we look at directors’ purchases. In addition to their significantly 
higher trading frequency prior to ad-hoc news releases, they obviously trade on valuable 
information. E.g., the CAR[0;+20] for front-running purchases equals 6.57%, whereas 
the transactions without ad-hoc news disclosures result in a mere profit of 1.89%. 
Moreover, the difference in means between both types of purchases is highly 
statistically significant, indicating that directors trade on inside information. We get a 
similar result concerning the group of other insiders. Even though other insiders do not 
frequently front-run on corporate news, they do realize exceptional profits with those 
transactions. In particular, they realize CAR[0;+20] of 8.05% with front-running 
purchases. A handsome profit compared to the respective 2.36% they earn with their 
remaining transactions. The difference in means between both transaction types is also 
highly statistically significant. 
Regarding sales transactions, we find no specific group of insiders to be severely 
engaged in exploiting inside information. Although we predominately find the profits 
associated with sales which front-run on corporate news to be higher for all groups of 
insiders, differences in means of abnormal returns are not statistically significant. 
Again, this result could be driven by the fact that selling company’s stock does not have 
to be information-driven, but can be triggered by diversification, liquidity and tax 
considerations. 
To sum up, we can conclude that senior managers do not seem to exploit inside 
information. They seem to be aware that the public and the regulator monitor their 
trading records very carefully. Thus, they refrain from trading prior to ad-hoc news 
disclosures. And even if they do so, the information content of the subsequent ad-hoc 
news release seems to be quite negligible. In contrast, directors do not seem to fear the 
scrutiny of the regulator as they do not only purchase company’s stock quite frequently 
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prior to ad-hoc news releases but they also seem to front-run on extremely valuable 
inside information. A similar result applies to the group of other insiders. They also 
seem to exploit inside information. In contrast, the evidence for sales transactions is less 
clear-cut. Profits for sales which front-run on corporate news disclosure are 
predominately smaller than those for purchases and statistically insignificant for all 
types of insiders 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Our study analyzes a large sample of corporate insider transactions reported to the 
German supervisory authority BaFin in the period July 1, 2002 to April 30, 2005 using 
event study methodology. In particular, we focus on the question whether corporate 
insiders exploit inside information while trading in company’s stock. Our findings 
reveal that corporate insiders are able to identify profitable investment situations in their 
firms. E.g., they earn a profit of almost four percent in the 20 trading days after they 
purchased company’s stock. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that corporate 
insiders are engaged in the exploitation of inside information as they earn above average 
profits by front-running on corporate news. Finally, looking at the type of insider, we 
find that members of the supervisory board (directors) and the group of other insiders 
(basically family members of senior managers and directors) are the ones which trade in 
an unethical manner as they profit largely by exploiting inside information while front-
running on corporate news. In contrast, members of the executive board (senior 
managers) can be exculpated from exploiting inside information as they realize below 
average returns with their rare front-running transactions. 
Admittedly, our database might not be the ideal sample to study illegal insider trading. 
This is because intentional and offensive trading on inside information is not very likely 
to be reported to the supervisory authority. Therefore, it is alarming that we find 
evidence that insiders exploit inside information in those transactions which they 
consider to be unproblematic and thus report. Surprisingly, until now, the regulatory 
authority has done very little to enforce the law and thus to assure that insiders do not 
trade on inside information. Our results, however, strongly suggest to watch trading 
records of corporate insiders more closely; especially those trades which are shortly 
 19
succeeded by an ad-hoc news announcement. Particularly, those insiders (e.g. the group 
of other insiders) who are not in the spotlight of the public or the financial press do not 
seem to fear the scrutiny of the regulator as they extensively trade on inside 
information. Therefore, the BaFin should intensify its monitoring activities as well as its 
ability to impose sanctions to ensure market transparency and integrity of the German 
capital market. Otherwise, a continuation of illegal insider trading could compromise 
the functionality of the German capital market. Nevertheless, we also see the ball in the 
court of the firms themselves. They have to protect their insiders from allegations, 
justified or unjustified, by establishing voluntary commitments like blackout periods or 
trading bans prior to specific corporate news announcements.  
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